SOME LESSONS FROM THE CIVIL LAW.

The purpose of this brief article is not so much to set forth
any specific institutions disclosed by a study of the civil law, as
to point out some of those defects of our own system which
are accentuated by comparison with the civil law, defects due
to the methods rather than the substance of the common law.
There is no desire to urge such a radical and perhaps impossible
step as the substitution of civil law methods for our own; but
in the consideration of plans for the improvement of our law,
it may be profitable to observe that the other great legal system
has avoided some of the most obvious- defects under which we
labor, and the suggestion of a partial remedy may be ventured.
The civil law, as is well known, has had a history of some
two thousand years, and in its present physical form, so to speak,
its general principles have been codified into various codes. The
modern codification movement may be said to have begun with
the Austrian Allgenzeines Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, the Prussian
Landrecht of the eighteenth century, and the French codes of
the early nineteenth century. From France it has spread to
most of the other civil law countries, coming by way of Spain
and Portugal to the countries of Latin America. These codes
include in all cases a civil code, a commercial code, a penal code,
and codes of civil and criminal procedure; and with the development of economic life, following the tradition, other codes have
been promulgated in various countries, such as an industrial code,
a mining code, a maritime code, a rural code, a military code,
and other codifications of different branches of the law.
The most recent development of the civil law is contained
in those remarkable monuments of codification to which some
of the greatest legal minds of modem times have contributed,
namely, the German and the Swiss civil codes. The most prominent feature of all these codes is that they have laid down certain
general rules governing legal relations, leaving to the courts the
duty of applying the rules and filling in the details. Incidentally
the development of this system has drawn and continually draws
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to its service the best legal minds of all the civil law countries,
and judges in their decisions call to their aid the best critical
thought of the legal world. The German civil code, which for
twenty-two years received in its preparation the concentrated
constructive criticism of one of the ablest benches and bars in
all the world, supplemented by that of economists and business
men, is a practical demonstration of what legal science may contribute to the development of a well-rounded, practical and efficient system for the conduct of life and the adjustment. of
interests.
In civil law countries the decisions of courts are not binding
precedents, but when supporting a well-reasoned principle have
naturally great persuasive force. While attributing less authority to single decisions than Anglo-American courts, a consistent current of decisions or settled "practice" is regarded as
almost conclusive authority. As a matter of fact, there is practically no civil law country at the present day in which the
decisions of its highest courts are not regularly reported, and
both briefs and opinions cite previous decisions. Certainly one
of the greatest advantages which such countries enjoy is a large
degree of certainty in the law, which saves much litigation and
contributes to the development of a definite system. Not that
differences of opinion on numerous points of law do not exist;
but. the margin of uncertainty is, comparatively speaking, small.
A visit to some twenty countries in which the civil law
prevails and a certain degree of contact with the law and the
lawyers of those countries may permit one to express, by way
of comparison, a certain general opinion concerning the methods
of our own legal system, which, in the writer's opinion, hamper
its responsiveness to the social needs of the times. Our law is
largely what judges have made it and is the result of rules they
have applied in the adjudication of cases.. The guiding principle of our legal method, of course, is stare decisis. It is based
on the theory that when a court has once laid down a rule of
law in one or more cases the rule will no longer be open to examination or to a new ruling by the same tribunal or by those
bound to follow its decisions. This maxim involves no ref-
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erence to the correctness or fallacy of the precedent required to
be followed. At a time when precedents were comparatively
few, when economic life had not reached its present complexity,
when the great landmarks of the common law were still being
worked out, when judges all had time to think out their opinions,
the system was undoubtedly well adapted to the people for whom
it was designed to do justice.
But at the present day conditions have completely changed,
decisis has, it is believed, outlived its usefulness. Restare
and
ported decisions have enormously multiplied. The American case
law today is to be found in some nine thousand volumes of
decided cases, with three to four hundred added each year. The
attempt to retain the old system in the presence of these new
conditions has resulted in chaos in the law and in an inefficiency
in the administration of justice and an economic waste to the
community which are incalculable in their scope.
The rule of stare decisis is based upon the importance of
stability and certainty in the law, which, as Lieber said, was next
in importance to its justice. But with the "countless myriad of
precedents" supporting different sides of so many questions, it
is not unfair to say that stability and certainty, the reason for
the rule, have practically disappeared. And the manner in which
precedents have been used-or abused-has further destroyed
the value of the rule. Instead of adhering to the original maxim
that only previous decisions in the same jurisdiction are binding
precedents, many of our courts and our lawyers, when they deem
it desirable, draw upon the decisions of any other jurisdiction
in support of a conclusion. Nor is the distinction between ratio
decidendi and dictum properly maintained.
But most curious is the varying degree of consistency with
which different courts have adhered to the rule. Many courts
have considered themselves bound by former decisions although
frankly expressing doubts as to whether they were legally defensible. Other courts have considered it their duty to follow
decisions even if thereby they perpetuated error, regarding the
legislature as the only source of relief. Still other courts, in
the endeavor to uphold the principle and yet depart from a prior
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decision considered erroneous, have introduced the insidious
process of distinguishing and limiting, which, however much
its legitimate use may contribute to the growth of the law, has
been carried to a point at which it creates confusion and uncertainty. Wiile professing to uphold a rule of law, they actually
pare away all its substantial support. But few courts have
recognized that it was not the purpose of stare decisis to perpetuate judicial error.
One of the results of stare decisis has been a lack of flexibility in the interpretation of the lkw, notwithstanding its early
success in this regard. The common law rules, as has been demonstrated during the last decade, could not accommodate themselves to the social legislation of the present day and statutory
repeal of common law rules was in some cases necessary to secure
judicial recognition for such legislation. While it is well that
changes in law should be slow, there must be some measure of
harmony between the progress of the law and the development
of society. The principles of assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, and the fellow-servant rule, all favorable to the em-"
ployer, with the "due process" clause of our constitutions, were
responsible for much maladjustment and long delay in the recognition of the worker's rights.
But the slavish worship of precedent has had other results.
The system and the courts demand that to sustain a proposition
of law previous supporting decisions must be cited. To enable
the lawyer to examine the immense mass of judicial law, enterprising publishing companies have prepared voluminous digests
which are designed to make his task easy. Incidentally, it may
be said that it is not the principle of law which is emphasized in
this digesting of cases, but rather the similarity of fact, and it
may be. added that by the customary treatment of a case in
minute cross-sections, the broad principle of law is generally
completely lost. The result of the system is that in practice
the lawyer to whom a case is presented for litigation immediately
feels called upon to search for similar or analogous cases and
it is commonly stated that with fifty or more jurisdictions in this
country now handing down decisions, there are few points 6f
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law doubtful enough to require litigation in which decisions on
both sides can not be found.
A better picture of the place now occupied by judicial decisions in our legal system has perhaps never been presented
than that drawn recently by one of the ablest lawyers and scholars
in the United States. His remarks warrant quotation:'
"We have spoken of the annual 'output' of judicial reports,
and the phrase, with its thrifty flavor, is deliberately chosen; for
the publication of reports is little regulated and thoroughly commercialized. With each court there is connected a pipe promptly to
convey its product to the great centre of distribution; and from this
centre, day by day, month by month, year by year, there is poured
out, as through a great main, upon a gurgling, gasping, sputtering
bar, a turgid stream of judicial decisions. Here there is no discrimination, no estimation of merit or of importance. Cases petty
and cases important, cases of national interest and cases of interest
purely local, final decisions, and decisions either reversed or on the
way to reversal, are, with generous impartiality, spread broadcast
over the entire land.
"This system is supported by the bar, with mingled feelings
of gratitude and despair; for the bar is conscious of the fact that
while it is in a sense served by the system, it is also enslaved and
debauched by it. The very multiplicity of cases, and the consequent
impossibility of dealing with them scientifically, reduces practitioners to a reliance upon particular decisions rather than upon general
principles; and this in turn accentuates the tendency, long ago abnormally developed, to pay undue respect to mere cases as authority.
How often do counsel produce with an air of triumph the latest
decision, rendered perhaps in some far off jurisdiction by a judge
whose opinions derive their weight solely from his official position!
Ilow often, too, do they cite cases in their briefs indiscriminately!
Some years ago the statement was made that in a single volume of
reports then lately published more than five thousand cases were
cited; and although this number would seem to suffice, possibly it
may since have been exceeded."
The lawyer, therefore, in presenting his case is concerned
less with reason or principle than with the necessity of finding
as many cases as possible which are like the one at bar and
support his conclusion. The efforts of his mind are concerned
much less with legal reasoning than with distinguishing ingeni'Address before the Alumni of the Law School of the University of
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ously the cases that are against him and by analogy drawing
into line those that seem to support him. The result is an ever
increasing dialectic technicality. The system tends to make
smart men, rather than learned men.
The advantages derived from our political system of a federation of states have brought some penalties, among others,
numberless conflicting judicial decisions which must be assimilated in the law. The courts have to go but little beyond the
briefs of the attorneys for all the- decisions which they need to
consider, and while many able opinions are still delivered, the
customary decision usually adds but one more case to the uncertain line of decisions which has been constructed upon a given
point of law. The attempt to make a selection of the cases
to be reported has apparently met with no support from the
bar. The advantage .of the homogeneous judicial hierarchy enjoyed by England has enabled the bench to co-operate with the
bar, so that the Council of Law Reporting excludes from the
Law Reports cases which are valueless as precedents, although
the eager demand for decided cases still prompts the Law Times
and other similar publications to report many of the discarded
cases. In this country, recommendations to bring about some
selection in the reporting of cases have been left unheeded. Our
common law more than ever has become a "wilderness of single
instances", and for that very reason the need is now greater than
ever for emphasis upon guiding principles. In many branches
of our law, it is now almost futile to endeavor to deduce a
guiding principle from the decided cases. Certainly it is unfortunate that, as happens so often in our larger cities, the
same state of facts leads to one legal conclusion in a state
court and to a different conclusion in a federal court a few
hundred yards away.
There is some difference of opinion as to whether judges
should be appointed or elected. But the system of electing
judges for-short terms, usually without consulting the bar, is
surely unwise and makes it surprising that our bench when thus
recruited can still boast of so many good judges. The tremendous pressure under which most courts labor, due to the
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great amount of litigation they must dispose of-much of which
would be unnecessary under a more efficient system-renders a
carefully reasoned and scholarly opinion very nearly a physical
impossibility and an all too infrequent occurrence. The system
of case citation as the guiding rule of our legal method in reality
caters to the incompetent judge, for, with the power to rely upon
previous decisions, it enables a judge so inclined to avoid the
necessity for independent thinking.
The demand of our courts for case law is naturally met by
the bar, by publishing companies and by writers. The demand
of both bench and bar is met by the law schools, the one institution from whom we have the right to expect a contribution
and an encouragement to learning and scholarship. Very few
law schools in this country pay the slightest attention to the
history of law, to the theory of law, or to legal science as a
whole. The study of these subjects is an absolute requisite in
civil law countries. How few of our students acquire any
familiarity with the contributions of such jurists as Amos, Maitland, and Gray, not to mention von Jhering, Gierke and Duguit,
to cite but a few jurists who have written for the whole profession throughout the world. The work of such leaders of
thought as Wigmore and Pound receives far too little appreciation from our bar and our courts. Far too few among our
lawyers have taken advantage of the recent translation into English of standard works of foreign jurists by which Professor
Wigmore and his colleagues have placed at the disposal of the
American lawyer some of the most valuable contributions to
legal history and legal science. It remains with the law schools
to take the initiative in improving our bar and through our
bar, our law. They must assist in overcoming the contempt
which the practicing lawyer of today has for what is termed
"jurisprudence" or the science of law. Dicey states that "jurisprudence stinks in the nostrils of a practising barrister" and this
unattractive sentiment has been echoed not only by practitioners
but by professors of law in this country. Perhaps it is the
natural distrust of the unknown which inspires the dislike.
It must be admitted that the case system of studying law
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classified into subjects to be mastered in three years, however
desirable as a method of legal training, gives but little time for
the study of law in its larger sense as a social science, as a vital
factor in the maintenance of the social order, as a field of knowledge which requires in its service the aid of the best scholars.
The veneration of judicial precedent, the corner stone of our
system, the vitalization of the maxim that "an ounce of precedent is worth a pound of principle", has encouraged hackwriters, compilers, and digesters, who are indeed at times cited
without discrimination as authorities. In England they are at
least consistently severe in this regard. Lord Chancellor Haldane recently protested against Halsbury's "Laws of England"
being cited as authority in his court, and Lord Justice Vaughan
Williams objected to a similar use of Odgers on Libel, expressly
endorsing the old idea that counsel were not to cite living authors
as authorities. Thoughtful writers and thinkers on the law,
who have contributed so greatly to build up the civil law, are
given no encouragement under our system because their opin-.
ions, however well reasoned and mature, have not as much authority as the opinion of the weakest judge in a litigated case.
Probably most of our lawyers are too busy or too little inclined
to observe that but very few scholarly contributions to our legal
literature are being made.
It will be necessary to mention only a few of the specific
problems in which our weakness is additionally demonstrated by
comparison with the civil law. Reform in procedure, of course,
was the first watchword of our law reformers, and up to the
present time slight improvements have indeed been made in some
states. In the civil law countries, procedure is made as simple
as possible. The codes of civil procedure of most of the civil
law countries contain usually less than fifteen hundred articles
of a few lines each, 2 setting forth certain general rules which are
2

The following table shows the dates and number of articles in the codes

of civil procedure of the following civil law countries:

Argentina
(Buenos Aires) Dec. 9, 1907
Aug. i, i895
Austria
Belgium
Mar. 25, 1876

96i
602
io42

Italy
Luxemburg
Monaco
Netherlands

June
Apr.
Sept.
June

25, 1865 950
14, i8o6 io42
5, i896 977
7, 1838 899
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designed to enable contending parties quickly to join issue, and to
facilitate the trial and dispatch of litigated cases. Procedure
occupies its proper place as a means to an end, the end being the
prompt adjudication of conflicting interests according to law. It
must be admitted also that procedure is not equally bad in all
states, but the State of New York, more populous than all but one
of the civil law countries on this hemisphere, may not unfairly be
pointed to as an example of how far we sometimes divorce law
from justice. A complicated code of civil procedure of over
three thousand three hundred sections, many of enormous length
and full of technicalities, has enabled lawyers time and again to
thwart, delay and overburden with expense the adjudication of a
meritorious cause. The innumerable decisions on questions of
procedure signify enormous sums paid by clients who have substantive rights to be determined instead of subjecting themselves
to a game of jockeying between attorneys-a game which continues in fact throughout the trial of a cause, for the trial judge
is but little more than an umpire to secure observance of the rules
of the game. An examination of the reports of the highest
courts in the countries of Western Europe for 1913 discloses that
the number of decisions on questions of procedure is almost
negligible. The number of new trials on technical points and the
complexity of appellate procedure in this country are really, it
may be truthfully said, unknown to the countries of the civil law,
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Ecuador
France
Germany
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary

Dec. 31, 1857
Nov. 25, 185o

993

Aug. 28, I902

IIOO

June
Apr.
Jan.
July
Mar.
Jan.

806

z8, 1897 1034
14, i8o6 1O42
30, 1877 lO48
18, 1834 963
i, i9o6 13o6
8, 1911 792

Paraguay

Aug. 14, 1876
Jan. 1, 1884

Peru
Portugal
Spain
Switzerland
(Federal)
Uruguay
Venezuela

July 28, 1852

Nov.
Feb.
Nov.

774

1824
8, 1876 1178
3, 1881 2182

22,

1850

203

Jan. 17, 1878 1362
777
Apr. 18, 194o

The following are the number of articles in the codes of civil procedure
of various code states of the United States. Some exclude evidence and
some are merely practice acts.
California
Georgia
Idaho
Iowa

Louisiana
Montana

21o4
lO4O
2343
1299

xi6I
1855

New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma

3384
542
2154
962

South Carolina
Tennessee

1991

492
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or, for that matter, even in England. In addition, lawyers' fees
are much more moderate in the civil law countries.
Again, our complicated rules of evidence have made for
technicality and in many cases unfortunately are employed not
to reveal but to suppress the truth, and the fact that they are
legal rules' renders the judge powerless to disregard them for the
purpose of ascertaining the truth. Probably no brahch of our
law affords the student more intellectual pleasure or appeals more
to logic than the law of evidence, and no proposal to abolish it
would meet with favor. Our rules of evidence, of course, grew
up with the jury system and were intended largely for the guidance of the jury. Perhaps that is one reason why the civil law
countries get along without these technical rules which are embraced in our law of evidence. The jury in civil cases is practically unknown to them. Civil cases are presented to a judge,
usually a man of the best training, who hears conflicting evidence
and judges of its weight for himself. Moreover, at least in
Central and Western Europe, the oath has much greater sanctity.
than with us apparently and perjury is severely punished. In our
own system there is no doubt that the jury is a much overworked
institution and does not necessarily contribute to justice, the presumptive aim of all systems of law. It is a well-known fact
that when lawyers have a weak case they prefer a jury to a single
judge sitting alone, for "one can always take a chance with a
jury." There is every reason why ordinary civil and commercial
cases can be better decided by judges without juries, and in
England, in fact, the jury is now practically employed only in
certain tort cases, such as malicious prosecution and slander and
libel. Workmen's compensation acts have also diminished the
necessity for the jury, for they have replaced those common law
rules of liability which were favorable to the employer and were
only tempered by a jury favorable to the employee. If we could,
therefore, gradually decrease the employment of the jury in civil
cases, we should render less necessary many of the technical rules
of evidence, we should have fewer new trials on errors due to
the jury system, and we should greatly lessen the cost of litiga-
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tion, besides gaining other advantages too obvious to require
statement.
One of the most serious defects of any legal system is uncertainty, and of that we have an abundance. The mass of conflicting and inconsistent decisions, on substantive and adjective
law, has invited a mass of legislation. The enactment of rules of
procedure is still in the hands of legislatures, instead of being, as
in the British Empire generally, a part of the rule-making authority of the courts. 3 The general ignorance of legislative technique'
has resulted in a great deal of ill-considered aid badly drafted
legislation, which has necessitated more judicial construction, and
so on in the vicious circle. The purpose of stare decisis was to
make for certainty in the law. The verdict of experience is that
we have probably more uncertainty in the law than any other
civilized nation, and that Coke's admiration for the common law
system because derived from actually decided cases has but little
justification today. As Mr. Wigmore has pointed out, we have
lost all of the advantages of stare decisis and have retained and
intensified all of its advantages.
It may be asked how we shall escape from the disadvantages
of our legal method. Feasible plans are not easy to frame, but
if a suggestion may-be ventured, it is this: only by a change in
our legal habits, combined with a rational system of codification,
the codification of controlling principles and precedents. Whatever its weaknesses, codification offers probably the best solution
for our difficulties. It has tremendous obstacles to overcome in
our political system of sovereign states and the tendency to local
particularism which discourages uniformity. A slight beginning, greatly appreciated, has, however, already been made in the
acceptance of some of the drafts of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. We need not, therefore, consider the task as
hopeless. We might with considerable profit examine the
method of codification adopted in British India, where by the
use of what is known as "Macaulay's invention" of adding auSee "Studies in English Civil Procedure: IL The Rule Making Authority," by Samuel Rosenbaum, in 63 UNIv. OF PENNA. L. REv. 151 (i9i5).
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thoritative illustrations to the enacted text of a code they have
achieved the advantage of a clear statement of the general principles of many branches of the law, while retaining the great advantage of case law in preserving the record of the remedies
applied in the solution of actual cases.
But at the present moment, it is submitted, we are not ready
for codification. Our law schools have not met their obligation
of training a sufficient number of men who would be competent
to take up such a monumental task. The law schools should offer
an opportunity to qualified students for training in the principles
of legal history, legal theory, and legal science in general, the
absence of which Professor Redlich criticized in his recent report
upon our system of legal education. One of the incidents of our
insularity has been a neglect of foreign languages. Few of our
lawyers can intelligently read a foreign law book, yet much of
the world's best thinking in law has been made known in a foreign
tongue. Greater emphasis upon modern languages will be an
important factor in enabling our law students to acquire that
broader and deeper substructure of legal knowledge which is
essential. It has been the observation of the writer, after contact
with lawyers of some twenty countries, that the education of our
bar, taken as a whole and considering the average, is more superficial than is that of the bar of nearly every other civilized country. But very few of our lawyers think in terms of society, or
have any other than a merely business-certainly not a scientific
-interest in the law. And yet if our law is to be improved it
must be done by the bar itself on its own initiative, for the general
public, notwithstanding the bitter experience of individuals, has
proved indifferent to the social waste entailed by the present
inefficiency of our system.
The aim then must be to institute in our leading law schools,
in addition to the present courses for active practitioners, certain
advanced courses in legal research to cover the history, the theory
and the philosophy of law, and comparative law, and thus stimulate constructive scholarship. A proposal to extend our law
course to four years might be regarded as inexpedient, notwithstanding the fact that in the civil law countries of Western
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Europe and Latin America the law course covers from five to
seven years. Moreover, experience has shown that however
admirable the case method is pedagogically, it takes the average
student nearly a half-year to feel at home and in tune with his
work, especially as many of our law schools fail to give the student an introductory survey of the law as a consistent whole.
If three years, however, is to be the limit of instruction, a portion of the work of the third year might be devoted to the subjects
mentioned above, in order (i) to give every practitioner some of
the rudiments of legal science, and (z) to enable the more serious
students to acquire a taste for deeper learning in the law and a
desire to continue further the pursuit of legal knowledge. If the
law schools can exercise this progressive influence on our bar, it
will inevitably reach the bench, the law, and the system itself.
Edwin M. Borchard.
Washington.

